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Learning is typically understood as a process in which the behavior of an organism is
progressively shaped until it closely approximates a target form. It is easy to comprehend
how a motor skill or a vocabulary can be progressively learned—in each case, one
can conceptualize a series of intermediate steps which lead to the formation of a
proficient behavior. With grammar, it is more difficult to think in these terms. For example,
center embedding recursive structures seem to involve a complex interplay between
multiple symbolic rules which have to be in place simultaneously for the system to
work at all, so it is not obvious how the mechanism could gradually come into being.
Here, we offer empirical evidence from a new artificial language (or “artificial grammar”)
learning paradigm, Locus Prediction, that, despite the conceptual conundrum, recursion
acquisition occurs gradually, at least for a simple formal language. In particular, we
focus on a variant of the simplest recursive language, anbn, and find evidence that (i)
participants trained on two levels of structure (essentially ab and aabb) generalize to the
next higher level (aaabbb) more readily than participants trained on one level of structure
(ab) combined with a filler sentence; nevertheless, they do not generalize immediately;
(ii) participants trained up to three levels (ab, aabb, aaabbb) generalize more readily
to four levels than participants trained on two levels generalize to three; (iii) when we
present the levels in succession, starting with the lower levels and including more and
more of the higher levels, participants show evidence of transitioning between the levels
gradually, exhibiting intermediate patterns of behavior on which they were not trained; (iv)
the intermediate patterns of behavior are associated with perturbations of an attractor in
the sense of dynamical systems theory. We argue that all of these behaviors indicate a
theory of mental representation in which recursive systems lie on a continuum of grammar
systems which are organized so that grammars that produce similar behaviors are near
one another, and that people learning a recursive system are navigating progressively
through the space of these grammars.
Keywords: counting recursion, artificial grammar learning, center embeddings, sequence learning, context-free
grammar, graded state machine
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1. INTRODUCTION
Recursion refers to “a process that calls itself ” (Pinker and
Jackendoff, 2005) and provides a way to “make infinite use of
finite means” (Von Humboldt, 1999; see also Chomsky, 1957). In
natural language, it refers tomorphological and syntactic patterns
in which one phrase is embedded inside another of the same
type (e.g., [NP PP NP] or [NP [V [Comp [NP VP S] CP] VP] S]).
Recursion is found in almost all natural languages, although it is
still a matter of debate whether it is language universal (Everett,
2005; Nevins et al., 2009).
Center-embedding recursion [as in (1) below] refers to the case
in which a phrase is embedded in the middle of a phrase of the
same type. To process center-embedding recursion structures like
(1-a) and (1-b), the language system must keep track of each
constituent that has been started and not finished, and in cases
like (1-a), the order in which these have occurred. If one assumes
that the recursion processing system is capable of processing
center-embedding patterns to arbitrary levels of embedding,
then an infinite state mechanism is necessary for recognizing
or generating all and only the legal structures (Chomsky, 1956;
Hopcroft and Ullman, 1979).
(1) a. [The book [that the man [who hired me S] wrote
S] deals with politics. S] (Cowper, 1976, quoted in
Lewis, 1996)
b. [[anti [[anti-[missile N′ ] Adj] missile N′ ] Adj]
missile N′ ]
Christiansen and Chater (1999) distinguish two subtypes of
center-embedding recursion: mirror recursion and counting
recursion (see also Chomsky, 1957). The processor of a counting
recursion language (e.g., anbn) must keep track of the number of
symbols of a particular type in order to generate or recognize all
and only the strings of the language1. The processor of a mirror
recursion language (e.g., {ab, xy, aabb, axyb, xaby, xxyy, aaabbb,
aaxybbb, . . .}) must keep track not only of the number of symbols
of a particular class, but also of their order.
Much debate in the artificial language learning domain has
centered around the question of whether animals or humans
trained in a laboratory setting can learn a mirror recursive
language, as opposed to a mere counting recursive language
(Fitch and Hauser, 2004; Perruchet and Rey, 2005; Bahlmann
et al., 2006, 2008; Friederici et al., 2006; Gentner et al., 2006;
Corballis, 2007; De Vries et al., 2008; Van Heijningen et al., 2009;
Lai and Poletiek, 2011, 2013). Prior studies suggest that human
learners can learn at least counting recursion in the lab and,
1Fitch and Friederici (2012) rightly note that anbn need not be generated with a
rule that matches the first A with the last B, the second A with the second-to-last
B, etc.—other schemes are possible. They argue that, because of this, anbn is not
definitively a recursive language. We do not think much hangs on the question of
this terminology—what matters is the fact that a finitely defined processor of the
language needs to employ a self-referential memory principle. We include anbn in
the class of “recursive” languages because the weakest Chomsky Hierarchy class
capable of generating it has to employ a rule that calls itself, either directly or
indirectly. We do not claim that the successful learners of the language learned
the recursive rules. As pointed out by Fitch and Friederici (2012), participants may
have learned a count-and-match strategy, although we think the count-and-match
strategy as well as counting itself requires recursive generalization.
according to Lai and Poletiek (2011), can learnmirror recursion if
they are exposed to lower levels of embedding earlier than higher
levels of embedding.
In this study, we aim to elucidate the process of recursion
learning.We therefore focus on counting recursion, with which it
is relatively easy to get robust generalization behavior, suggesting
abstraction to a recursive rule. We argue that new insight into
the way the human mind reaches and encodes such abstraction
can be achieved by looking in detail at the learning process. To
this end, we introduce a novel experimental task called “Locus
Prediction” which provides rich information on the learning
process.
Sometimes counting is categorized as a “strategy” and
dismissed as uninteresting (e.g., De Vries et al., 2008). We agree
that our participants, who certainly all learned how to count long
before they participated in our experiment, may, in some cases,
have eventually recognized the utility of using their counting
ability to succeed with our task. We claim that it is the process of
getting to the point of that recognition that is worth examining
in detail. Indeed, as we report below, the task is not trivial in
that many participants fail to solve it, and these show a range of
behaviors which suggest that their minds are developing toward
a formulation of the counting principle before they actually reach
it. We also find that the work we have done on this counting
recursion case establishes a foundation for analyses of mirror
recursion cases, which we have explored in separate experiments
(Tabor et al., 2012a; Cho et al., 2014).
What kind of novel understanding can be derived from
this close examination of the learning process? There are three
main points: (1) people seem to be able to proceed through a
series of discrete grammatical systems which more and more
closely approximate the target recursive grammar; (2) in between
these states, they appear to occupy a continuum of states that
smoothly transition from one discrete state to the next; (3)
although it is natural to conceptualize (2) in terms of probabilistic
grammar mixture, this conceptualization involves a challenging
teleological assumption: people command a grammar of the
future before they have fully adopted it (they mix it with a
grammar of the past to form the current, blended grammar
state). A careful empirical examination of the intermediate states
indicates that something additional is occurring: the system
exhibits a stability phenomenon, such that errors on one word
enhance the chance of errors on a subsequent word, with the
enhancement decreasing as each successive word is processed.
This phenomenon is reminiscent of attractors in nonlinear
dynamical systems theory. Helpfully, this theory offers a possible
avenue out of the teleology.We go over these arguments carefully
in General Discussion.
1.1. Motivating Dynamical Systems Models
By dynamical systems, we mean formal systems that are
characterized in terms of how they change. Typically, they
are expressed as systems of differential equations or iterated
maps (Strogatz, 1994). Several language-learning connectionist
networks of syntactic processing are iterated map dynamical
systems (Elman, 1990, 1991; Tabor, 2003, 2011). For example, the
Simple Recurrent Network (SRN) (Elman, 1990, 1991) consists
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of a layer of input units which feeds forward to a recurrently
connected layer of hidden units; this, in turn, feeds forward
to a layer of output units. In the context of language learning,
the SRN is trained to receive a sequence of words one word
at a time and predict the next word. A prominent feature
of such systems, which differentiates them from other models
of cognitive processing, is their employment of continuous
parameter and state spaces.
In the continuous parameter spaces (e.g., the weight space
in the SRN), the structure of the knowledge representation
continuously transforms as the systems learn (Tabor et al., 2013a).
Tabor (2003) explores such a model, called a Fractal Learning
Neural Network of the learning of some mirror recursion
languages. He finds that the model progresses through a series
of stages: early on, it can only handle sentences with one level of
embedding. As training processes, the system masters two levels,
then three, etc. with the times of mastery for each level decreasing
in such a way that the system handles a close approximation of
the infinite-state language after finite time. Moreover, between
the mastery of each level, the system makes subtle changes in
its encoding which shift it gradually from one level to the next
(see also Tabor et al., 2013a). Inspired by these observations,
we designed the experiments below to encourage participants to
progress through successive levels and we sought evidence that
they exhibit intermediate behavior when they transition between
the levels.
In their continuous state spaces (e.g., the activation space
in the SRN), typical dynamical systems are organized around
attractors (Tabor et al., 2013b). An attractor is a subset of the
state space with the following properties: (1) if placed inside
the subset, the system will remain at it forever; (2) if placed
slightly off (or perturbed) from the subset within some positive
radius, the system will return to the set over time. The majority
of research on dynamical systems has focused on autonomous
systems: the system is a map (alternatively, a set of differential
equations) from the state space to itself; attractors are often found
among the limiting behaviors of such systems as time goes to
infinity. Here, we are interested in a non-autonomous case: the
system is driven simultaneously by its internal parameters and
an environmental input that has a particular, predictable form:
the environment is a series of symbolic events, the occurrence
of symbols from a context free language which have a particular
statistical distribution. Also in this case, it appears that the
system’s behavior can be organized around an attractor-like
structure—i.e., a set to which the system returns when perturbed,
provided that the environment obeys the grammatical structure
following the perturbation2.
For example, in Tabor et al. (2013b), we ran numerical
simulations of an SRN, training it on sentences randomly drawn
from a finite state language, L = {ab, aabb, aaabbb}. We found
that, when the trained model was processing sentences randomly
drawn from L (with an exponential distribution of sentence
types as a function of length), the model consistently occupied
a restricted portion of its state space which we refer to as the
“grammatical manifold.” When the trained model was perturbed
2See Tabor (2015) for an extension of the definition of “attractor" to this case.
by adding some random noise to its state or by presenting an
unexpected word, it visited states off of the grammatical manifold
immediately after the perturbation but gradually returned to
the manifold in the course of processing grammatical sentences.
Motivated by this observation, we sought evidence that humans
who learned a recursive artificial language would gradually return
to grammatical behavior after perturbation as they continued to
receive grammatical input from the language. This prediction
also hinges on the assumption that the system’s states lie in
at least an approximate continuum, because there need to be
intermediate locations that it can occupy, as it returns gradually
from the perturbed location back to the original trajectory.
1.2. Research Hypothesis
We hypothesize that people trained on a sample of sentences
from a recursive artificial language are gradually adjusting the
continuous parameters of a dynamical system which is capable
of developing attractor-like structures; this system is a highly
plastic learning device and it can mirror the distribution of
the input well. However, when the input exhibits sufficiently
strong evidence for recursion, the system will generalize from
the input to an approximation of the recursion. We made four
predictions based on these assumptions and on our previous
work with the Locus Prediction paradigm (Cho et al., 2011): (H1)
training on low embedding levels of a recursive pattern should
facilitate generalization to a higher level more than training
on a non-recursive pattern, though the facilitation may not be
immediate; (H2) training on more levels of recursive embedding
should facilitate recursive generalization more than training on
fewer levels of recursive embedding; (H3) a system learning a
recursive pattern will proceed through stages3 corresponding to a
series of grammars with successively deeper levels of embedding,
and it will show gradual transitioning between the stages; (H4)
an established pattern of behavior will show properties of an
attractor: given an established pattern of behavior, unexpected
events should perturb the system away from the established
pattern, but as the system processes additional words that occur
in grammatical sequence, the deviation magnitude will gradually
decrease.
Complex learning developments may involve abrupt
transitions such that it is possible to say, at one point in time,
that the system has one structural character and that, a short
time later, it has a qualitatively different character. In such a case,
it is still possible that the transitions consist of continuous, but
relatively rapid, changes. The importance of discovering such
continuity, if it turns out to exist, is that it is currently a mystery
how a complex, interdependent system like a recursive grammar
can come into being in learning. Discovering some intermediate
stages could help shed light on this mystery.
3Sometimes, the term stage implies discontinuity or abrupt transition between
ordered states (Van derMaas andMolenaar, 1992). In this study, we use the term to
distinguish among different periods in learning in which an individual’s behavior
seems to be generated by different symbolic grammars which are ordered such that
each successive grammar handles longer dependencies than the previous one. By
the use of the term “stage,” we do not imply discontinuity from one stage to the
next.
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There is a natural alternative to our hypothesis about the
character of grammar learning, suggested by many models that
approach learning as a probabilistic structure selection process.
For example, Perfors et al. (2011) consider a sample of finite state
and context free grammar models of English word sequencing
and they use a Bayesian scheme to progressively update the
model’s hypothesis about which grammars are most likely to have
generated the input as more and more sentence examples are
sampled from a training corpus. This type of model can also
plausibly predict (H1) through (H3), but it does not predict the
existence of the attractor structure (H4). Nor does it provide a
clear motivation for the structures that it must assume to predict
(H3). We further discuss the contrast between these views in
General Discussion.
To demonstrate the acquisition of infinite-state recursion, one
would need to test an infinite number of cases of unbounded
length. This is not empirically feasible, and indeed, the evidence
from natural language experiments indicates that exact recursive
behavior (at least with mirror recursive cases) breaks down
quickly as the number of levels grows (Miller and Isard, 1964; see
discussion in Christiansen and Chater, 1999). To our knowledge,
most prior artificial grammar studies on humans (Fitch and
Hauser, 2004; Perruchet and Rey, 2005; Bahlmann et al., 2006;
Friederici et al., 2006; Bahlmann et al., 2008; De Vries et al.,
2008) have trained participants up to a particular level, k, of
recursive embedding and then tested on novel combinations that
have less than or equal to k levels4. Lai and Poletiek (2011)
is a notable exception, but their method involves interleaving
deeply embedded test exemplars with the training stimuli, raising
the concern that the participants may have learned the deep
embeddings from the test stimuli. Since a minimal finite state
grammar for levels 1 through k fails to generalize to k+1 levels,
and since performance on recursive structures degrades with
level (Miller and Isard, 1964), training on levels 1 through k and
testing on k+1 is an efficient way to obtain evidence for recursive
generalization. We take this approach in this paper. Motivated by
the numbers typical in real natural language we explored k = 2
and k = 3 in the experments reported here.
1.3. Overview
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in The Locus
Prediction Task, we introduce our new task. In Experiments
1 and 2, we describe experimental results that lend support
to the first two research hypotheses (H1 and H2). In Gradual
Recursive Generalization, we introduce new methods of analysis,
suitable to our novel paradigm which help test the hypotheses
concerning gradualness, and describe data supporting the last
two research hypotheses (H3 and H4). In General Discussion, we
conclude.
2. THE LOCUS PREDICTION TASK
A main goal of the present study is to understand developmental
change in grammar during recursion learning. For this purpose,
4In this paper, we use a level k to refer to the number of as (or bs). Note that a
level-1 sentence has a sentence with 0 level of embedding.
we need to efficiently obtain precise information about the
structure of grammars learned by participants. Almost all the
prior studies of recursion learning have employed the standard
artificial grammar learning (AGL) paradigm (Reber, 1967;
Saffran et al., 1996; for an exception, see Alexandre, 2010).
Typically, participants are exposed to a set of grammatical
sentences in the training phase and then are asked to judge
if novel sentences are grammatical or not in the test phase.
Although this approach provides an approximate analog of
the real language learning situation, it has some shortcomings.
First, it is inefficient because only one data point is collected
per sentence. Second, there is a risk that people’s knowledge
is distorted by exposure to the ungrammatical examples that
must be used in the test phase. Third, it is not feasible to glean
detailed grammatical structure information during the process of
training.
A widely employed method in sequence learning studies (for
review, see Clegg et al., 1998), the serial reaction time (SRT)
paradigm (Nissen and Bullemer, 1987; also see Cleeremans
and McClelland, 1991; Alexandre, 2010), does give information
about word-to-word transitions: participants observe a sequence
of locations highlighted on a computer screen and they must
click on each location after it is highlighted. Reaction times
are recorded and used to infer information about what the
participants have learned. However, even this method provides
indirect and ambiguous information about the particular
grammatical events participants are expecting at each juncture
between words: a high response time on a particular word could
occur (i) because the participant was expecting a different word
(ii) because the word was expected, but difficult to process (cf.
Gibson, 1998) (iii) because the word occurs at a point where it is
natural to do some additional processing (for example, at the end
of a phrase).
For the purpose of evaluating participants’ knowledge more
directly, the SRT task is often followed by a prediction task in
which participants are given a sequence of locations (presented
in the SRT task) and asked to predict a location to be highlighted
(e.g., Cleeremans and McClelland, 1991; Jiménez et al., 1996).
Alternatively, the SRT task can be followed by a generation
task in which participants are asked to generate a sequence
of locations following a given location (e.g., Destrebecqz and
Cleeremans, 2001; Visser et al., 2007). Typically, the prediction
or generation task is given once at the end of learning with
the SRT task so does not allow the investigation of knowledge
change during learning. A notable exception is Visser et al. (2007)
in which the SRT task was alternated with the generation task
to allow the evaluations of participants’ knowledge at several
time points. The use of prediction/generation with the SRT
task is an excellent way of studying implicit sequence learning
but it is not ideal when the research interest is in grammatical
knowledge change: (i) Learning/training phases (with the SRT
task) are strictly separated from evaluation/test phases (with
the prediction/generation task) with an unrealistic assumption
that participants do not learn during the evaluation phase. (ii)
It is not easy to determine how to distribute the evaluation
phases so that all important knowledge changes can be captured.
(iii) It is not easy to detect fine-gained, possibly continuous
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FIGURE 1 | A marked up initial display for the Locus Prediction task. In
the actual display, the boxes were not numbered.
change because inserting toomany evaluation phases will hamper
learning.
We employed the Locus Prediction task (Cho et al., 2011;
Tabor et al., 2012a,b) in which participants predict each
successive symbol rather than react to it as in the SRT5.
Participants initially observe a computer screen displaying an
image like Figure 1without the numbers. When they click on the
screen, one of the boxes changes color. The color changes occur
in accordance with a grammar: in this case, Grammar GR, shown
in (2).
(2) S→ 1 S 2 3 4
S→ 1 2 3 4
Grammar GR generates a variant of the a
nbn language. Its
sentences are [1 2 3 4] (level-1 sentence or S1), [1 [1 2
3 4] 2 3 4] (level-2 sentence or S2), [1 [1 [1 2 3 4] 2
3 4] 2 3 4] (level-3 sentence or S3), and so on. Sentences
drawn from the grammar were sequenced by a pseudorandom
process into one long symbol sequence of several hundred
symbols’ duration. Since the order of the sentences was
essentially unpredictable, there was an indeterminacy whenever
a 1 occurred: it might be followed by a 2 or it might be
followed by another 1. We employed a coloring scheme to
identify such nondeterministic events for participants: when a
1 occurred after another 1, the 1-box turned blue or cyan.
On all other trials, one of the four boxes turned green. We
told participants that they only needed to predict the green
boxes (deterministic transitions). By only requiring participants
to predict deterministic transitions, we made it possible, in
principle, for them to perform perfectly on the task. When the
same box had to change color on two trials in a row, the color was
randomly chosen between blue and cyan under the constraint
that the same color could not be used for two successive
transitions. To reinforce the visual feedback that participants
5The task is same as the prediction task used in Cleeremans and McClelland
(1991) but we distinguish ours from other prediction tasks used in the SRT
paradigm for the following reasons. In our study, there is no separation between
training/learning and test/evaluation phases. In prior SRT studies, researchers
have used the prediction task for evaluation purposes only and tried to prevent
participants from developing knowledge while they are performing the prediction
task. We use the prediction task to drive the development of grammatical
knowledge and we can infer many details of the forms of this knowledge by
observing participant’s predictions at every time step.
received when they failed to correctly predict a green box, a beep
sounded6.
The Locus Prediction task has some advantages over the
standard AGL task and the SRT task. First, Locus Prediction
makes it possible to collect a response at every transition
and, unlike in the SRT task, this response provides very
specific information about how participants’ understanding of
the structure of the language evolves during the experiment.
For example, Tabor et al. (2012b) studied progression of the
grammatical system by investigating prediction behavior in
windows across training. In the current study, we also take
advantage of the rich information the task yields in order to
detect behaviors that occur during the learning phase and seem
to be mixtures of various simple grammatical systems. Second,
no ungrammatical sentences are used so there is no risk of
distorting a learner’s developing knowledge with misleading
ungrammatical information. Third, as we show below, accuracy
rates in this task can be very high, providing strong evidence of
recursive generalization. (We define recursive generalization as
the significant tendency to generalize correctly to an untrained
and deeper level of embedding than any of the levels experienced
previously.) Fourth, human behaviors can be directly compared
to the outputs of the Simple Recurrent Network (e.g., Cho
et al., 2011). The SRN has been widely used to study sentence
processing and offers a formally unified account of diverse
sequence learning behaviors.
It is true that Locus Prediction involves explicit prediction of
upcoming words, and thus does not resemble the most common
mode of learning and using natural language, in which listeners
do not explicitly predict upcoming words. There is now extensive
evidence from the psycholinguistic literature that prediction is
an integral part of word and sentence processing (Altmann and
Kamide, 1999; Hale, 2001; Dahan and Tanenhaus, 2004; Levy,
2008). Also, as pointed out by Elman (1991), childrenmightmake
covert predictions when they are learning; if this is right, then our
task could be thought of as amplifying an action that children are
engaging in anyway. By giving feedback on prediction at every
step, we are able to watch some participants become very skilled
predictors in the course of a 15–20 min experiment, shedding
light, we think, on the emergence of this critical ability.
3. EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment 1, we tested the hypothesis (H1) that training
on low embedding levels facilitates recursive generalization to
one deeper level of embedding more than training on a non-
recursive pattern. Given a finite training set, participants can
perform perfectly on the training set by memorizing each of its
sentences (H0). If this is how they succeed on the training set,
we expect generalization behavior to be equally poor, no matter
what sentences they are trained on. If, on the other hand, the
6This scheme has the property of encouraging participants to predict all
deterministic transitions correctly and to predict 2 after 1, even though either 1
or 2 can occur after 1 at non-deterministic transitions. Nevertheless, participants
are not penalized for failing to predict 2 after 1. In future work, it may be helpful
to explore the variant in which participants are penalized every time they fail to
predict 2 after 1.
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participants induce a recursive rule, we expect generalization to
deeper levels of recursion. To compare H1 and H0, we created
two finite languages, L1 and L2, both of which consisted of
three sentences of different lengths (see Table 1). The first two
sentences of L1 have a simple recursive relationship to one
another in the sense that there is a context free grammar GR,
such that the parse of S1 is a subtree of the parse of S2. On the
other hand, the first two sentences of L2 do not have a simple
recursive relationship in the sense that there is no context free
grammar for which the parse of S1 is a subtree of the parse of S2.
In Experiment 1, we exposed “Sequence 1” participants to the first
two types from L1 and “Sequence 2” participants to the first two
types of L2. We then probed the performance of the participants
in each group on S3. We predicted that the participants exposed
to Sequence 1 would perform better on S3 than the participants
exposed to Sequence 2.
3.1. Materials and Methods
3.1.1. Participants
Ninety-nine undergraduate students of the University of
Connecticut participated in the experiment for course credit.
This and the following experiments were approved by the
University of Connecticut Institutional Review Board, and all
participants provided informed consent.
3.1.2. Materials and Design
We used a between-subjects, single factor design in which the
sequence of words presented to participants was manipulated
across two levels (SeqType = Sequence 1 vs. Sequence 2). Fifty
and forty-nine participants were assigned to the Sequence 1 and
Sequence 2 conditions, respectively.
A sequence of 404 words (Sequence 1) was created by
concatenating many instances of the three sentence types (S1,
S2, and S3) ordered by a pseudorandom process and obeying the
following constraints: First, the first 300 words (corresponding
to the study phase) consisted of 31 S1s and 22 S2s. Second, S2s
occurred less frequently at the beginning and more frequently
at the end. Third, the last 104 words (corresponding to the test
phase) consisted of 8 S1s, 3 S2s, and 4 S3s. The sequence ended
with an S1. The actual sequences used in Experiment 1 and 2
are presented in Supplementary Materials, Section 17. Because
we did not collect participants’ predictions at the last trial, we
excluded their predictions on the last S1. Note that no S3s were
presented before the beginning of the test phase. Thus, examining
the test phase provides an opportunity to examine generalization
from lower levels of embedding to higher levels. Note also: from
the participants point of view, there was nothing marking the
division between one sentence and the next nor was there any
7We used one sequence for each condition to reduce variance in our performance
measure; we do not think that changing the order of the sentences while preserving
the structure thus described would have a noticeable effect on the outcome. Also
lower embedding levels were always introduced earlier than higher embedding
levels and there weremore lower embedding levels than higher embedding levels in
the beginning of the sequence. This was intended to make learning easier (see Lai
and Poletiek, 2011, 2013). In a subsequent study (Tabor et al., 2014), we observed
similar learning when we presented randomly different versions of a stationary
model sequence, suggesting that the result reported below is not due to the specific
sequence that we used.
division between the training and test phases—the materials
came as one long sequence of symbols.
Another sequence of 404 words (Sequence 2) was created by
replacing S2s in Sequence 1 with S
∗
2s (= 1 1 4 3 2 4 2 3); thus
Sequence 2 had the same sentence-type distribution as Sequence
1. Given that there is no recursive relation between S1 and S
∗
2 , the
experience of S1s and S
∗
2s was not expected to help generalization
to S3s in the test phase as in Sequence 1.
3.1.3. Procedure
The experiment was run individually on a PC using E-Prime
(Version 1.2) (Schneider et al., 2012). Participants were given a
description of the locus prediction task (see Section The Locus
Prediction Task) and then performed the task. The computer
program recorded the responses and response times. Each session
took about 15 min.
3.2. Results
One participant who was trained on Sequence 2 was excluded
from the further analyses because the individual’s mean accuracy
across all trials was very low (M = 0.082); the participant did not
predict which box would change color but clicked on whatever
box had changed color after it changed color.
Sentence-level prediction accuracy, SentAcc, was defined as
follows: SentAcc = 1 if all deterministic transitions of a level-n
sentence were correctly predicted; SentAcc = 0, otherwise. By
deterministic transitions, we mean the transitions that can be
predicted with certainty. Let Tij be a transition from box i to box
j. In our simple language, T11 and T12 (plus T14 in Sequence 2)
are nondeterministic transitions and all the other transitions are
deterministic.
The top and middle panels of Figure 2 show trajectories of
the average sentence prediction accuracy (SentAcc) against the
position of sentence in each sequence (Sentence Index) separated
by sentence types (SentType) in Sequence 1 and Sequence 2
conditions8. The test phase started with the first instance of S3.
In the Sequence 1 condition, SentAcc of S3 increased from very
low level to reasonably high level with more experience of the
sentence; in the Sequence 2 condition, SentAcc of S3 did not
increase as much.
We asked: Is there any evidence that the participants in either
condition generalized their experience from the training phase to
the test phase?
First, we noted that five of 50 participants (10%) correctly
processed the first instance of S3 in the Sequence 1 condition. By
contrast none of the 48 participants in the Sequence 2 condition
correctly processed the first instance of S3. This numerical
contrast is in line with our prediction that Sequence 1 participants
would generalize better, but it is not a significant result. A
chi-squared test indicates that the two distributions are not
significantly different, χ2
(1)
= 3.20, p = 0.073.
Because Locus Prediction gives us detailed information about
the processing of each sentence, we can go further. We examined
8In this paper, we focus on accuracy analyses. Data gathered in the locus prediction
paradigm contains additional useful information: one can also examine which box
participants pick when they deviate from accurate prediction (Tabor et al., 2012b)
and reaction times.
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TABLE 1 | Finite languages used in Experiment 1 (L1 and L2) and 2 (L3).
L1 L2 L3
S1 = 1 2 3 4 S1 = 1 2 3 4 S1 = 1 2 3 4
S2 = 1 1 2 3 4 2 3 4 S
*
2 = 1 1 4 3 2 4 2 3 S2 = 1 1 2 3 4 2 3 4
S3 = 1 1 1 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 S3 = 1 1 1 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 S3 = 1 1 1 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4
S4 = 1 1 1 1 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4
FIGURE 2 | Trajectories of average sentence prediction accuracy
(SentAcc), separated by sentence types (SentType) in Experiment 1
(the top and middle panels), and Experiment 2 (the bottom panel). The
mean sentence prediction accuracy represents the proportion of the
participants who correctly processed all deterministic transitions of a level-n
sentence at a particular position in a sequence of sentences.
all the trials in the first instance of S3 for each participant. To be
conservative, we assume that all participants in the Sequence 1
condition could correctly predict T23 and T34 transitions (recall
that Tij refers to a transition from Box i to Box j) because
the transition probability was 1 in Sequence 1 and we ignored
nondeterministic transitions because they cannot be predicted
with certainty. Thus, we have three remaining transitions: two
T42s and one T41 (associated with three positions [boldfaced] of
S3 [1 1 1 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4]). Note that the correct prediction of
the next word upon receiving word 4 requires the knowledge of
a nonadjacent dependency. Because only 1 and 2 occurred after 4
in the study phase, we assume that the learners can reject 3 and 4
regardless of whether they have acquired a recursive grammar.
Thus, on each of the three remaining transitions, participants
have a 50% chance of getting it right if they do not know the
recursive pattern but are guessing randomly between boxes 1
and 2. This gives a chance level of 0.125 (= (1/2)3) for the
three trials combined. The exact binomial test indicates that the
proportion (= 0.1) of those who generalized is not different
from chance (= 0.125), M = 0.1, 95% CI = [0.033, 0.218],
p = 0.830. Thus, contrary to our expectation, we found no
evidence that participants trainedwith Sequence 1 anticipated the
recursive extension of their training experience. No one exposed
to Sequence 2 achieved spontaneous generalization9.
So far, we have found no evidence for generalization in line
with our prediction, but our hypothesis of a representational
continuum makes a further prediction: Sequence 1 participants’
representations may be close to recursive insight without
actually being there, while we expect Sequence 2 participants’
representations to be further away from recursive insight.
Therefore, we predict that with the further training on S3’s
provided by the Test Phase, Sequence 1 participants should
quickly learn the more deeply embedded pattern, while Sequence
2 participants should be slower to do so.
We tested whether the sentence prediction accuracy on a novel
sentence type S3 introduced in the test phase is different between
two sequence conditions, using a loit mixed-effectsmodel (Jaeger,
2008)10. The relative position of S3 (IndexS3 = 1, 2, 3, 4) and
sequence type (SeqType) were included as fixed effects11. A
by-subject random intercept and a by-subject random slope of
IndexS3 were included as well without assuming a correlation
between them12. The likelihood ratio tests between this model
and another model with either one of the main effects excluded
revealed that both main effects of IndexS3 and SeqType were
statistically significant: bIndexS3 = 1.301, SEIndexS3 = 0.490,
χ2
(1)
= 4.44, p = 0.035; bSeqType = −5.855, SESeqType = 1.252,
χ2
(1)
= 17.20, p < 0.0001. The odds ratio of SeqType (Seq2
to Seq1), 0.003 (= e−5.855), suggests that participants given
Sequence 2 were much worse in processing S3s than participants
given Sequence 1, although the sentences were equally new to
both groups of participants.
9The chance level of making all correct predictions on an instance of S3 is much
lower in the Sequence 2 condition than in the Sequence 1 condition. Note that in
Sequence 2, 2 can be followed by 3 or 4; 3 can be followed by 1, 2, or 4; 4 can be
followed by 1, 2, or 3. Thus, participants have a 50, 33, or 33% chance of making a
correct prediction given word 2, 3, or 4, respectively. Because each of words 2, 3, 4
occurs three times in an S3, chance level is equal to ((1/2)(1/3)(1/3))
3 (= 0.00017).
An exact binomial test suggests that 0% of success was not significantly different
from chance.
10All models investigated in this study were fit using the lmer function included
in the R package lme4 (Bates et al., 2015) with themaximum likelihood estimation
method.
11A model with the interaction term between IndexS3 and SeqType was not
selected because a likelihood ratio test revealed that adding the interaction between
IndexS3 and SeqType to the model with SeqType and IndexS3 as fixed effects did
not decrease deviance significantly, χ2
(1)
= 1.46, p = 0.227.
12When a correlation between the random intercept and the random slope was
assumed, the model failed to converge.
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It is true that there are more grammatical continuations for
each word in Sequence 2 than in Sequence 1. For example, 4 is
followed by 1 or 2 in Sequence 1 while it is followed by 1, 2,
or 3 in Sequence 2. This means that, after the training phase,
a bigram model predicts higher average prediction accuracy
in Sequence 1 than in Sequence 2 as observed. However, the
bigram model cannot explain the observed trial-level prediction
accuracies. Consider a bigram model that updates conditional
probabilities after processing every word and consider what will
happen when the model processes an S3. Whenever the model
processes a T42, P(2|4) increases and P(1|4) decreases. Thus,
when the model experiences a string of several T42’s, as it does
in an S3, the accuracy should steadily increase across these and
then should plummet on the final T41. The observed pattern is
very different from this: the first T42 and the T41 in the first S3
have high average accuracies (near 75%) while the second T42
average accuracy is 19% (see Supplementary Figure 1). We tested
whether the prediction accuracies were different across those
three transitions of the first S3, using a logit mixed-effects model
with TransitionType (first T42, second T42 [reference level], and
T41) as a fixed effect as well as a by-subject random interecept.
The test suggests that participants predicted the second T42
significantly worse than the first T42 (b = 1.836, SE= 0.370,
z = 4.97, p < 0.0001) and T41 (b = 2.142, SE= 0.379, z = 5.66,
p < 0.0001).
In sum, participants learned a novel, deep embedding (S3)
better when they were trained with sentences in a recursive
relationship (Sequence 1) than when trained with sentences not
in a recursive relationship (Sequence 2). This is consistent with
our hypothesis of a representational continuum: we hypothesize
that those participants trained on Sequence 1 were closer (on
the continuum) to the a recursive encoding than those trained
on Sequence 2, without actually being at the recursive encoding.
Therefore, it took more steps in the test phase for the Sequence 2
participants than the Sequence 1 participants to become capable
of handling the deeper level of embedding. However, there is no
evidence of spontaneous generalization in this experiment. Given
the apparently stable patterns at the second half of the training
phase (see Figure 2), the failure of spontaneous generalization
is probably not due to short training. Rather, we hypothesized
that if Sequence 1 participants had received more information
indicating the form of the recursive pattern, they would have
spontaneously generalized it.
4. EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 2, we investigated whether participants could
spontaneously generalize to one deeper level of embedding if
they were exposed to more sentence types holding a recursive
relationship. For this purpose, we used a finite language L3, with
one additional level of embedding (see Table 1). We created
a sequence of sentences such that three sentence types S1, S2,
and S3 occurred in the training phase and the test phase began
with an instance of S4. We expected that with exposure to
more lower levels of embedding, we would observe spontaneous
generalization to higher levels.
4.1. Material and Methods
4.1.1. Participants
Sixty-nine college students of the University of Connecticut
participated in the experiment for course credit.
4.1.2. Materials and Design
A sequence of 456 words (SeqType= Sequence 3) was created by
concatenating many instances of the four sentence types (S1, S2,
S3, and S4) as in Experiment 1 where S4 = 1 S3 2 3 4 (see Section 1
in Supplementary Materials). The first 304 words (corresponding
to the study phase) consisted of S1s, S2s, and S3s
13.
The last 152 words (corresponding to the test phase) began
with an S4 and included a mixture of S1s, S2s, S3s, and S4s. The
sentences with the deepest level of embedding (S3 in Sequence 1
[Exp1] and S4 in Sequence 3) were not presented during the study
phase. Thus, examining the test phase provides an opportunity to
examine generalization from lower levels of embedding to higher
levels.
4.1.3. Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1. Each session
took about 20 min.
4.2. Results
One participant was excluded from further analyses because the
participant’s overall mean trial prediction accuracy was very low
(M = 0.119).
The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows trajectories of the average
sentence prediction accuracy (SentAcc) separated by sentence
types (SentType) in Experiment 2 (Sequence 3). The average
sentence prediction accuracy trajectory of S4 in the test phase
of the Sequence 3 condition (down-pointing triangles on the
bottom panel) look very different from the trajectory of S3
in the test phase of the Sequence 1 condition (top-pointing
triangles on the top panel), suggesting that a high proportion
of participants correctly processed all deterministic transitions of
the first instance of novel sentence type S4.
Twenty-eight (41%) of 68 participants trained with Sequence
3 correctly predicted the first instance of S4. The probability of
correctly predicting the first three T42s and the last T41 of an S4
by chance is 0.0625 (= (1/2)4). The exact binomial test suggests
that 41% successful generalization is above chance, M = 0.412,
95% CI = [0.294, 0.538], p < 0.000114. Thus, in Experiment
2, unlike in Experiment 1, there is strong evidence of recursive
generalization at the first encounter of a new level of embedding.
As in Experiment 1, a close investigation of trial-level
prediction accuracy (see Supplementary Figure 2) suggests that
when the learners failed to predict a sentence, it was mainly
13The first instance of the highest-level sentence erroneously appeared four words
(from an S1) later in Sequence 3 than in Sequence 1. Given the stability in
performance on Sequence 1 at the end of the training period (Figure 2), it is highly
unlikely that this difference could explain any difference in generalization behavior
between two conditions.
14Even considering only the 14 participants among the 68 who got every S4 right
through the test phase (that is, those whose correct performance on S4’s was
especially stable), the exact binomial test with the same chance-level proportion of
0.0625 (note that this criterion is very conservative) indicates that the proportion
of successful generalization is above chance, p < 0.0001.
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because they failed to predict the penultimate pop transitions
(i.e., the last T42 [4-to-2 transition] in a sentence). Although
the pattern is not expected from a bigram or trigram model, it
is expected if the learners have acquired a higher-order n-gram
model during the training phase.
We define the n-gram prediction accuracy for the t-th word
(ACCn(t)) as follows:
ACCn(t) = P(Wt|Wt−n+1 · · ·Wt−1) =
N(Wt−n+1 · · ·Wt−1Wt)
N(Wt−n+1 · · ·Wt−1)
where Wt is the t-th word in the experiment sequence; and
N(·) is the count of an n-gram observed in the subsequence
W1 · · ·Wt−1 of an experimental sequence. In other words, this
model can remember sequences n symbols long. At each word
in context, it predicts the next word by examining all the
preceding circumstance in which there were n-1 preceding words
matching the current context. It chooses the next symbol by
drawing randomly from the four possible symbols in proportion
to how often they each occurred in all such preceding length n-1
contexts. When the model encounters n-1 words that it has never
seen before, it reduces the context length until it finds at least
one preceding instance. Note that after a single S1 has occurred,
the model can always find a matching n-gram for some n > 0
because, at that point, all four symbols have occurred.
Although this simple n-gram model can make context-
dependent predictions, it can never make correct predictions on
the first instance of a novel sentence type with a deeper level of
embedding. For example, consider a 14-gram model which can
make correct predictions from the second instance of S4 because
at this point, it has already experienced the 13-gram context 1 1
1 1 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 which was followed by 2. This model has
no knowledge of the 13-gram context when it encounters the first
instance of S4. The model therefore goes down to the 12-gram
context 1 1 1 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 (= S3) which it has experienced in the
training phase and predicts 1 based on this experience. However,
the correct prediction is 2. Thus, the 14-gram model makes a
wrong prediction at the penultimate 4 of the first instance of S4.
This failure to generalize to longer sequences is a general property
of n-gram models.
The results of Sequence 3 training thus provide evidence
of recursive generalization and are not plausibly handled by a
finite-state account.
5. GRADUAL RECURSIVE
GENERALIZATION
We have so far taken advantage of the fact that the Locus
Prediction task gives us detailed information about individual
sentences, thus gleaning evidence for first-try generalization.
Another advantage of the task is that it allows us to investigate
the learning process in detail.
In this section, we focus on the Sequence 3 training,
showing (i) that participants progress through a series of
stages corresponding to successively more complex finite state
approximations of the recursive language in a fashion similar
to what Tabor (2003) observed with Fractal Learning Neural
Networks. This result is not surprising, for we presented the
materials in a correspondingly staged fashion, but it serves
as a foundation for further analysis. We then show (ii) that,
in making this progression, the participants do not transition
discretely from stage to stage—instead, they spend much time
in behaviors that seem to be blends of stages. Finally, we
providence evidence (iii) that the details of the blends cannot
be explained by positing noise added to the finite state models
or by assuming probabilistic mixture of these models—instead,
the pattern suggests an attractor in the dynamical systems sense.
The section thus provides evidence that the representational
continuum we have been observing is of the sort commonly
observed in nonlinear dynamical systems.
5.1. Preparatory Analysis
We used a Grammar Bearing Point Language Classification
Algorithm (GBPLCA) (see Section 2 in Supplementary Materials)
to obtain a sequence of grammars from each individual. The
algorithm uses sentence-level response patterns to hypothesize
a grammar after each sentence has been processed by each
participant. It assumes that an individual’s grammar is updated
right after the individual has processed a sentence and the
updated grammar is reflected in the individual’s response to
the next sentence input. The basic idea is to compare empirical
profiles of trial-level prediction accuracy on different sentence
types withmodel profiles (seeTable 2) and, for each sentence that
each participant processed, to assign the participant to a model
that fits the participant’s behavior up to that point if possible15.
A model profile, FiniteM, for a level-N sentence (where M ≤
N) is expected under a finite-state grammar GM consisting of M
symbolic rules that generate S1, · · · , SM. We also consider the
recursive grammar GR which generates all the sentences of the
target language.Wewill refer to G1 through G4 andGR as bearing
point grammars.
We assumed that all symbolic grammars predict 3 after 2 and 4
after 3 because 2 is always followed by 3 and 3 is always followed
by 4 in the experimental language. We ignored the predictions
of nondeterministic transitions T11 or T12 because they cannot
be predicted with certainty. Thus, the models of learners can
make wrong predictions only when they encounter word 4. After
they made wrong predictions on a certain T42 in the middle of
level-2, 3, 4 sentences, they are assumed to predict 1 after 4. This
behavior guarantees that all models make correct predictions of
the T41 occurring at the end of all sentence types. With these
assumptions, learners with symbolic grammars can be different
only in terms of their prediction accuracy on T42s.
The algorithm takes a sequence of sentence-by-sentence
prediction accuracy profiles (e.g., [0 0 1 1][ 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0] ...) from
each individual and returns a sequence of grammars (e.g., G1, G0,
G0, G1, ..., G1, G2, ...) that we refer to as an individual grammar
trajectory. Specifically, for each new sentence, the algorithm
15We do not claim that the participants actually learned such symbolic finite-state
or recursive grammars. When we classify an individual learner’s grammar into Gk,
we simply mean the learner’s response pattern matched the behavior of the bearing
point grammar. Similarly, when we classify an individual’s grammar into GR, we
do not mean the learner acquired specific recursive “rules.” Rather, we mean the
individual achieved recursive generalization to novel sentence types.
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TABLE 2 | Model profiles of trial-level prediction accuracy motivated by symbolic grammars.
S1 S2 S3 S4
1 2 3 4 1 1 2 3 4 2 3 4 1 1 1 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 1 1 1 1 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4
Finite1 * 1 1 1 * * 1 1 0 1 1 1 * * * 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 * * * * 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
Finite2 * * 1 1 1 1 1 1 * * * 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 * * * * 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
Finite3 * * * 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 * * * * 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
Finite4 * * * * 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Note: A 0 indicates that the participant got the prediction wrong. A 1 indicates that the participant got the prediction right. The asterisks under the word-1 columns indicate that the
predictions of nondeterministic transitions are ignored.
checks to see if it matches a profile in Table 2. In the case of a
match, and if the performance on the sentence is perfect, then the
person at that time is assigned either the status corresponding to
the perfect match (status Gk corresponds to row k of the table) or
the preceding status of the participant, whichever is higher. In the
case of a match on row k where the performance was not perfect,
the algorithm checks the most recent instances of all sentences
of other lengths. If the person has done at least as well as Gk on
each other sentence length, then the status Gk is assigned. In all
other cases, the status G0 is assigned. A special case applies to GR:
in addition to the above criteria, the only way that a participant
can be assigned status GR is to perform perfectly the first time
he or she encounters a sentence at level k for k ≥ 1. In sum,
the algorithm assigns status Gk if a person has most recently
demonstrated Gk competence, but any aberrant behavior results
in assignment to G0.
Because the data can only be collected at discrete time points,
the data gathered will inevitably give the impression of a series
of saltations. It is possible for the data to look this way when, in
fact, the mental trajectory that gives rise to them is continuous.
Although we cannot explicitly demonstrate continuity, we can
demonstrate intermediacy, and intermediacy is a kind of indirect
evidence for continuity. Specifically, we will show that learners
progress through a series of stages, G1, G2, G3, G4, GR, each
of which is described by a simple grammar and the grammars
are naturally ordered by the length of the dependencies they
track. Moreover, we will present evidence that between the
first four stages, we can observe behaviors that are manifestly
intermediate between them, though not in a simple averaging
sense, thus revealing a non-trivial continuity underlying the
discrete differences.
Figure 3 presents sample trajectories of individual grammar
changes. The top panel suggests that Subj12 predicted the next
wordmainly based on a simple rule S→ 1 2 3 4. Themiddle panel
suggests that Subj22 learned the sentence structure of all four
sentence types but did not spontaneously generalize to a deeper
level of embedding. The bottom panel presents the grammar
change of an individual who learned recursion. The transition
from G3 to GR (observed around the third vertical line) tells
us that the individual correctly processed the first instance of a
novel S4.
5.2. Result (i): Stages of Learning
Now we check to see if learners progress from grammars with
lower levels of embedding to grammars with higher levels of
FIGURE 3 | Sample trajectories of individual grammar changes. Three
vertical lines indicate where the first instances of S2, S3, and S4 were
introduced.
embedding, in line with the Fractal Learning model of Tabor
(2003). For each participant, a transition count matrix was
constructed with the G0s ignored. For example, the series of
transitions G1 → G0 → G2 was treated as the transition
G1 → G2. The progression hypothesis predicts that the number
of transitions in the upper triangle (Gj → Gk where j < k)
be greater than the number of transitions in the lower triangle
(Gk → Gj where j < k) of the transition count matrix, ignoring
the diagonal elements. A paired-samples t-test revealed that
the number of transitions from grammars with less embedding
to grammars with more embedding (M = 2.52, SD = 1.32)
was significantly greater than the number of transitions in the
opposite direction (M = 0.84, SD = 0.90), Mdiff = 1.69,
t(66) = 13.00, p < 0.0001, supporting the progression
hypothesis16.
5.3. Result (ii): Intermediate Behaviors
In this section, we explore the G0 states, noting that they
often occur between the Bearing Point grammars and often
mediate the transition from one Bearing Point grammar to
another. For each participant, we constructed a transition
count matrix again, this time including G0s. The matrix of
16One participant was excluded from the analysis because the participant’s
grammar trajectory consisted only of G0s.
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transition counts aggregated across all participants is presented
below:
∑
i
Ci =


G0 G1 G2 G3 G4 GR
G0 2023 150 60 52 24 10
G1 163 504 40 4 2 1
G2 65 16 486 15 2 5
G3 40 6 3 397 7 16
G4 15 1 1 3 146 0
GR 19 1 2 1 0 208


where the cell (Gj, Gk) indicates transitions from Gj to Gk For
example, the aggregated number of transitions from G1 to G0
was 163.
The matrix reveals a large number of cases in Row 1 and
Column 1 [even with cell (1, 1) not counted]. In fact, about 83
percent of the off diagonal elements lie in Row 1 or Column 1.
This suggests that the transitions between states G1, G2, G3, G4,
and GR happen largely via the G0s. In other words, the G0s are
transitional between the other Bearing Point Grammar states.We
call this the “Intermediate States Hypothesis.” The Intermediate
States Hypothesis claims that the bearing point grammars lie
in a connected space of possible distributional patterns and
that the learner travels fairly directly (i.e., approximately linear
interpolation) between the distributions when transiting from
one bearing point grammar to the next one. However, there is
a confound. It could be that the main learning behavior is a
stepwise progression from G1 to GR but the behavior is very
noisy, and the G0s arise from the noise. In particular, one might
assume that the learner’s grammar (G1, G2, G3, G4, or GR) makes
a prediction, but the learner chooses between this prediction
and the uniform distribution across all four symbols with some
probability. If the G0s are just noisy versions of the Bearing
Point models in this sense, then they should show deviance from
high accuracy relative to those models on all transitions. We
call this the “Progression + Noise Hypothesis.” In the following,
we analyze the distribution of G0 states, finding it consistent
with the Intermediate States Hypothesis and inconsistent with
Progression+ Noise.
5.3.1. Interpolation Analysis: Graphical
First, we investigated how participants responded to S4 when
their grammatical knowledge was classified into two different
cases of G0s, ones observed between the first occurrence of G2
and the first occurrence of G3 and ones observed between the
first occurrence of G3 and the first occurrence of G4 or GR in
individual grammar trajectories. We refer to the two groups as
G0(G2, G3) and G0(G3, G4/GR), respectively. There was no case
of G0 included in both G0(G2, G3) and G0(G3, G4/GR).
We focused on S4 because this sentence type was presented
only in the test phase when participants were least likely to guess
next words randomly. We considered grammars G0(G2, G3) and
G0(G3, G4/GR) because they could not correctly process S4 so we
expect more chances to observe systematic errors. The first set
contained 12 response vectors and the second set contained 27
response vectors. Average response patterns to S4s when learners
were at G0(G2, G3) and G0(G3, G4/GR) are presented in a parallel
coordinate plot (see Figure 4).
The fact that the deviations in Figure 4 are concentrated on
the 4-transitions, which are the points where the grammar needs
to change at each stage in order to move to the next stage,
supports the Intermediate Stages hypothesis.
5.3.2. Interpolation Analysis: Statistical
Next we examined the structure of the distribution of grammar
states in the test phase, assuming that individual learners’
grammars did not change much in the test phase.
The Progression+Noise Hypothesis predicts that G0s should
be random distortions of Bearing Point Grammars so individual
learners should show the same amount of variation in prediction
accuracy across all transitions17. By contrast, because it claims
that the transitional states are approximately linear mixtures of
the bearing point grammar distributions, the Intermediate States
Hypothesis predicts that individual learners should show greater
variation on transitions (e.g., T42s) in which the Bearing Point
Grammars (G1 to GR) contrast than on transitions in which all
of them agree (e.g., T23 and T34s)
18. To test this statistically, we
applied the variance vector analysis of Cho et al. (2011) to the test
phase data.
First, we created an individual variance vector for each
individual, VT(i) = (v
(1)
i , v
(2)
i , · · · , v
(j)
i , · · · , v
(40)
i ), where v
(j)
i is
an individual i’s variance of trial-level binary prediction accuracy
across different instances for the j-th transition type in the test
phase; forty transition types (4 from level-1, 8 from level-2, 12
from level-3, and 16 from level-4) occurred in the test phase.
Second, we created a global variance vector as follows. (a) A
model vector of binary prediction accuracy across 40 transition
types was defined for each of four Bearing Point grammars based
on Table 2 as well as an additional Bearing Point grammar,
GRND
19. GRND corresponds to a grammar state at which an
individual randomly chooses one of four boxes so the expected
trial-level accuracy at GRND is 0.25 for all transition types. We
assumed that learners were at GRND at the beginning of the
experiment. (b) A vector, MT = (m
(1), · · · , m(40)), was created
such that m(j) is the expected prediction accuracy for the j-
th transition type averaged across the five model vectors. (c)
Assuming a Bernoulli distribution, a global variance vector, VT
= (v(1), · · · , v(40)), was created such that v(j) = m(j)(1−m(j)).
17When no random noise is assumed, any Bearing Point Grammar other than G0
predicts trial-level prediction accuracy of 0 or 1. When random noise is assumed
with noise level q, the expected trial-level prediction accuracy is q or 1 − q. The
variance in this noisy version is same in either case.
18This hypothesis predicts that individual learners lie on a manifold connecting
different Bearing Point Grammars. For example, assume that a learner is at an
intermediate state between G2 and G3. Based on Table 2, it is expected that the
learner’s expected prediction accuracy on the last T42 of S3 is in between 0 and 1.
Thus, the variance in trial-level accuracy on that transition should be greater than
the variance on other transitions. Note that the transition is where two groups of
learners who developed G2 or G3 differ from each other and this group difference
will be captured by the variance of the trial-level accuracy on that transition when
prediction data are aggregated across both groups. Thus, the hypothesis naturally
predicts that the larger a between-individuals variance is on a transition, the larger
a within-individual variance on that transition.
19In this analysis, we assumed that a learner at any Bearing Point grammar state
always predicts 2 after 1. Because participants were instructed to predict only green
boxes (i.e., deterministic transitions), most of them showed a very strong tendency
to predict 2 after 1.
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FIGURE 4 | Plot of mean prediction accuracy across different words of S4 separated by two types of G0. G0(G2, G3) corresponds to a set of G0 observed
between the first G2 and the first G3 in each individual; G0(G3, G4/GR) corresponds to a set of G0 observed between the first G3 and the first G4 or GR in each
individual.
Our hypothesis predicts that VT(i) would be more aligned
with VT than with a uniform variance vector, VU = (1, 1, · · · ,
1). The cosine of the angle between VT(i) and VT would be
greater than the cosine of the angle between VT(i) and VU. A
paired-samples t-test revealed that the former (M = 0.432, SD
= 0.216) was significantly greater than the latter (M = 0.397,
SD = 0.236), Mdiff = 0.036, t(67) = 3.95, p < 0.001, showing
that individual variability is not uniformly distributed around
bearing point grammars but aligns with the dimensions on which
the bearing point grammars differ. This result is consistent with
our hypothesis that there is a connected manifold that links the
bearing point grammars to one another20.
5.4. Result (iii): Evidence for Dynamical
Stability
The intermediate states show a subtle property that allows us
to obtain some further information about the nature of the
system. Consider another kind of noise model that is capable of
describing intermediate stages: when the system is in transition
between Gk and Gk+1 (k = 1, 2, 3) or between G3 and
GR, it probabilistically chooses between the two grammars at
each word-transition. This model, which we call “Probabilistic
Mixture of Bearing Points” predicts profiles in which the noisy
behavior is limited to the points of differentiation between the
two grammars. Indeed, such an account is roughly consistent
with the profiles shown in Figure 4, thus improving on the
Progression + Noise account. However, we will present evidence
that Probabilistic Mixture fails to capture a distinctive pattern
in the data. In Figure 4, the mean prediction accuracy on the
last T23 seems lower than the mean prediction accuracy on the
last T34 although both transitions are equally easy to predict.
It suggests that there are interactions between nearby trials in
the sequence such that the experience of the participant on one
trial can influence what happens on successive trials in ways that
are not captured by the grammar predictions about those trials.
20For seven participants, all elements of VT(i) were 0. To be conservative, we
replaced these individual variance vectors with VU.
We hypothesized that an error has a perturbing effect: it should
knock the system off the path of correct prediction on the trials
immediately following the error (T23s and T34 trials), but the
degree of distortion should diminish as the trials progress. We
call this account “Dynamical Stability.”
To test the hypothesis, we first compared trial-level prediction
accuracy for T23 and T34; the transition probability in Sequence
3 is 1 for both transitions. If noise is purely random, prediction
accuracy should be roughly equal for both transition types.
Binary trial-level prediction accuracy was modeled as a function
of WordType (dummy-coded with word 2 as reference level);
a by-subject random intercept, a by-subject random slope of
WordType, and the correlation between them were included as
random effects. The effect of WordType was significant, b =
0.535, SE = 0.098, z = 5.45, p < 0.0001; consistent with the
predictions of Dynamical Stability, the odds of correct prediction
was 1.7 (= e0.535) times greater for T34 than for T23.
Note that T23s follow more difficult-to-predict transitions
T42s (requiring processing nonadjacent dependency) and T12s
(involving uncertainty) while T34s follow very easy-to-predict
T23s
21.
This result is consistent with Dynamical Stability, but it does
not take into account the hypothesized perturbing events: the
errors on T42s. To test the claim that these errors were the
primary source of errors on following trials, we took prediction
accuracy on T23s right after T42s occurring in S2s, S3s, and S4s
in the experimental sequence and classified the data into two
groups depending on prediction accuracy on the previous T42
(PrevAcc = 0 vs. 1). We used a logit mixed model to test if
prediction accuracy on T23 after T42 was a function of PrevAcc;
a by-subject random intercept, a by-subject random slope of
PrevAcc, and their interaction were included as random factors.
The effect of PrevAcc was significant, b = 3.444, SE = 0.464,
21Prediction accuracy for T34s was significantly higher than prediction accuracy
for T23s both when T23s and T34s following T12s were considered, b = 0.621,
SE = 0.154, z = 4.02, p < 0.0001, and when T23s and T34s following T42s were
considered, b = 0.482, SE= 0.133, z = 3.62, p < 0.0005.
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z = 7.43, p < 0.0001; the odds of correctly predicting T23
was 31.31 (= e3.444) times greater after correct predictions of
T42 than after wrong predictions of T42, supporting the idea that
a prediction error tends to perturb a learning system such that
it makes a prediction error on the next transition although the
transition is very easy to predict. Similarly, the odds of correctly
predicting T34 was 34.17 (= e
3.531) times greater right after
correct predictions of T23 than right after wrong predictions of
T23, b = 3.531, SE= 0.270, z = 13.10, p < 0.0001
22.
It is clear that the mixture model cannot explain these
Dynamical Stability results because all bearing point grammars
considered in the mixture model predict T23 and T34 with
certainty so any non-noisy mixture of the grammars must predict
those transitions correctly and in a noisy mixture, the expected
rate of failure should be equal for both transition types.
6. GENERAL DISCUSSION
In Experiment 1, we presented evidence that human learners
are sensitive to recursive structure underlying a sequence of
box locations. The participants trained on low embedding levels
could learn a higher level more quickly than the participants
trained on a non-recursive pattern. In Experiment 2, we
provided evidence of spontaneous recursive generalization.
When participants were exposed to level-1, 2, 3 sentences in the
training phase, about 40% of participants correctly processed the
first instance of level-4 sentences newly introduced in the test
phase. Experiments 1 and 2 together suggest that human learners
can achieve recursive generalization in the Locus Prediction task.
There is some evidence that human learners and probably
some nonhuman animal learners can learn at least counting
recursion (Fitch and Hauser, 2004; Perruchet and Rey, 2005;
Bahlmann et al., 2006; Friederici et al., 2006; Gentner et al.,
2006; De Vries et al., 2008) and human learners can learn even
mirror recursion (Bahlmann et al., 2008; Lai and Poletiek, 2011,
2013). However, we find that these studies did not provide strong
evidence of recursive generalization, that is generalization to at
least one deeper level. In most of these studies, generalization
behavior was tested by investigating the learners’ ability to
recognize novel instances at the trained levels-of-embedding but
that type of generalization does not necessarily require recursive
rules. In the studies that tested generalization to deeper levels of
embedding (for example, Gentner et al., 2006; Lai and Poletiek,
2011, 2013), we noted that the result might have stemmed from
learning that occurred in response to test stimuli. A finite-state
model like an n-gram model can learn quickly after the first
instance of a novel sentence type. The present study provides
much stronger evidence of recursive generalization.
In the Gradual Recursive Generalization section, we provided
evidence that individual grammar systems metamorphose
22We ran the same analysis with the test phase data. The effect of PrevAcc was
statistically significant, b = 5.753, SE = 1.722, z = 3.34, p < 0.001, and the odds
of correctly predicting T23 was 315.1 (= e
5.753) times greater right after correct
predictions of T42 than right after wrong predictions of T42. Similarly, the odds
of correctly predicting T34 was 94.52 (= e
4.549) times greater right after correct
predictions of T23 than right after wrong predictions of T23, b = 4.549, SE= 0.785,
z = 5.80, p < 0.0001).
gradually by investigating the training phase data as well as the
test phase data from Experiment 2—as far as we know, our
study is the first detailed investigation of grammar change in
human recursion learning. More specifically, we showed three
aspects of developmental changes in recursion learning. First,
individual learners’ grammars progressed from a grammar with
low embedding levels to a grammar with high embedding levels
toward the ideal recursive grammar. Second, the interpolation
analysis suggests that grammar systems lie on a continuum
and individual learners explore this continuous grammar space
to acquire a grammar that can handle the language. In
other words, individual grammars do not “jump” from finite-
state grammars to the recursive grammar; rather, they change
gradually from finite-state grammars to the recursive grammar
through intermediate grammars. Third, participants made more
prediction errors even on the very-easy-to-predict transitions
(e.g., T23 and T34) right after they had made prediction
errors, supporting the dynamical stability account: A language
processing system recovers gradually from the perturbation
induced by an unexpected word while processing familiar events.
A mixture model of bearing point grammars cannot explain this
result because all bearing point grammars correctly predict those
transitions.
In sum, our study suggests that (a) participants are sensitive
to recursive structure in a language (Experiment 1); (b) they
can learn counting recursion such that they could generalize
beyond experience (Experiment 2) if they were exposed to level-
1 through level-3 sentences; (c) they learn recursion gradually
from a bearing point grammar with lower embedding levels
to another bearing point grammar with higher embedding
levels through some intermediate grammars (Gradual Recursive
Generalization); and (d) they recover from their prediction errors
gradually (Dynamical Stability).
What we observed on adults’ artificial language learning,
gradual grammar change, is consistent with neural network
studies with English-like artificial languages. Elman (1991, 1993)
observes the Simple Recurrent Network can learn an English-
like artificial language including center-embedding sentences if
the model is trained with the “staged input” (simpler sentences
earlier and complex sentences later) or if the model’s memory is
limited early in the training. It implies that the system develops
the knowledge of simpler structures earlier than the knowledge
of more complex structures. Although the effect of “starting
small” is under debate (Rohde and Plaut, 1999), a gradual
development of knowledge is a general property of dynamical
systems models and, if such models can explain human language
acquisition, of language acquisition. In our study, we reported
behavioral evidence for intermediacy in knowledge development,
contributing to the literature of rule learning and possibly of
language acquisition. We note that our findings do not weight
in for or against the Starting Small hypothesis because we did not
contrast conditions with and without Starting Small.
We focus now on possible explanations for the intermediacy
observed in the section on Gradual Recursive Generalization.
We noted in the Introduction that in a situation such as
the present one, where we have evidence that participants
are progressing through a series of structured forms which
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correspond to simple-to-specify grammatical systems, it is
natural to hypothesize a probabilistic grammar blending account.
This view corresponds to the Probabilistic Mixture of Bearing
Points (PMBP) hypothesis which we considered in the section
“Result (iii): Evidence for Dynamical Stability.” Such an approach
is natural to consider in light of the effectiveness of the simple
computational bearing points in describing the progression
discussed in the section “Result (i): Stages of Learning” when
faced with the evidence portrayed in Figure 4 of intermediate
behavior. Such an approach is also consistent with the currently
widely adopted strategy in cognitive modeling of identifying a set
of candidate computational mechanisms and then using Bayesian
inference to discover probabilistic mixtures of mechanisms
which make the data probable in light of the evidence (Perfors
et al., 2011). Nevertheless, we argued against probabilistic
mixture in the section “Result (iii): Evidence for Dynamical
Stability,” noting that the intermediate grammar states (the G0s)
include perturbation-related distortion of behavior on 2–3 and
3–4 transitions, which is not predicted by PMBP.
Now we consider the question more fully. We do not think it
is possible to entirely reject PMBP based on the evidence present
so far. It is true that PMBP does not predict the Dynamical
Stability effects on its own. Nevertheless, one might hypothesize
that there is some independent feature of the processing that
results in the perturbation effects: perhaps the perturbations
are like garden path situations in sentence processing—people
expect 1 after 4 but they get 2 and then they have to reanalyze,
which takes time. Before the reanalysis completed, they are
stuck with their previous interpretation so they make errors
on succeeding words until the reanalysis is done. If the time
it takes for reanalysis varies across participants (following,
for example, an exponential distribution), then the pattern of
decreasing errors after perturbation that we observed would be
expected. We think this model should be carefully considered
since it involves minimal divergence from well established ideas
in the field. At the same time, we take this opportunity to
articulate a different approach, inspired by the perturbation data,
which may also be worth carefully considering. The alternative
is motivated by a concern about teleology: the PMBP model
predicts the transitional behaviors by taking a weighted average
of a less complex bearing point grammar (e.g., G2) and a
more complex bearing point grammar (e.g., G3), and gradually
changing the weighting as learning progresses. In order to
perform this calculation, it must, in the implementation we
suggest, identify the more complex bearing point grammar as
soon as it begins to slightly diverge from the less complex bearing
point grammar. This amounts to a kind of teleology in the sense
the endpoint is recognized long before it is reached. In the case
of children learning natural language, it is plausible that long
evolutionary sculpting might have established in the brains of
infants a Universal Grammar containing many bearing point
grammars with respect to which learners could interpolate (see
Perfors et al., 2011). In the case of our artificial language, it is
less plausible to claim that people are born with the bearing
points of this particular domain. One interesting feature of
dynamical models like the Simple Recurrent Network (Elman,
1990) and the Fractal Learning Neural Network (Tabor, 2003,
2011) is that they characterize the grammatical structure itself
as a point in a connected space (Tabor et al., 2013b), rather
than characterizing the probabilistic weighting of grammars
as a point in a connected space, as PMBP does. This has
the consequence that the model can be expressed in simple,
“sub-symbolic” terms—for example, as weights on connections
between nodes in a network, rather than in terms of an inventory
of possible structures. Now, it is true that, in principle, such a
characterization might be behaviorally equivalent to a mixture-
of-structures model—it might predict exactly the same range of
behaviors with same probabilities. However, there is a constraint
in the mixture of structures approach which does not necessarily
hold in the dynamical approach: probabilistic mixture is a form
of linear mixture. Dynamical neural networks generally perform
nonlinear mixture—that is, they interpolate between observed
behaviors with nonlinear manifolds (Tabor, 1995). This means
that particular dynamical models make different predictions
about trajectories of learning than probabilistic mixture models.
Tabor (1995) presents evidence that such nonlinear mixture is
more suited to characterizing certain historical change episodes
than linear mixture approaches. The same approach to empirical
distinction may allow us to tease apart models of artificial
language learning. We leave this as a topic for future research.
We conclude that recursive systems lie on a continuum of
grammar systems which are organized so that grammars that
produce similar behaviors are near one another. People learning
a recursive system are navigating progressively through the space
of these grammars exhibiting evidence that they may embody
a dynamical system with a special kind of grammar-dependent
attractive set. The dynamical framework offers an interesting
nonlinear alternative to probabilistic mixture models and may be
worthy of further investigation.
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